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We investigated potential sources of infection for 6 
conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) patients who resided in urban 
areas of People’s Republic of China. None had known ex-
posure to sick poultry or poultry that died from illness, but all 
had visited wet poultry markets before illness. 
A
lthough >280 conﬁ  rmed human cases of avian inﬂ  u-
enza A (H5N1) virus infection from 12 countries have 
been reported (1), detailed data on sources of infection for 
most patients are limited (2). In Vietnam, 8 of 9 patients 
with inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) reported close contact with sick or 
dead poultry (3). In Thailand, 9 of 12 such patients lived in 
households where backyard chickens died, and 8 reported 
direct contact with dead chickens (4). Case-control studies 
in Thailand and Vietnam found that the most statistically 
signiﬁ  cant risk factor was recent exposure to sick or dead 
poultry, especially directly touching dead poultry (5,6). 
Avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) poultry outbreaks have been 
reported in mainland People’s Republic of China since 
2004 (7); since late 2005, human cases have also been re-
ported (8). Most Chinese patients had exposure to backyard 
poultry, although some had no apparent direct exposure to 
poultry that were sick or died. We describe ﬁ  ndings of in-
vestigations of urban patients with inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1), 
who had no known direct contact with sick poultry or poul-
try that died of illness in China.
The Study
Enhanced surveillance for inﬂ  uenza-like illness and 
pneumonia of unknown origin was established in China 
after the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) (9). All suspected cases of inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) 
are reported through a national surveillance system to the 
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China 
CDC). Laboratory testing is performed by the National 
Inﬂ  uenza Center of China CDC. A conﬁ  rmed case of in-
ﬂ  uenza (H5N1) was deﬁ  ned according to World Health 
Organization case deﬁ  nitions (10). This study was part of 
an ongoing public health outbreak investigation and deter-
mined by the ministry of health to be exempt from institu-
tional review board assessment.
China CDC conducted epidemiologic investigations by 
interviewing conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) patients and their 
relatives, reviewing medical records, and visiting patient 
households and places visited by patients within 2 weeks of 
illness onset. A standardized questionnaire was used to col-
lect demographic, clinical, and exposure history data. For 3 
severely ill patients, only relatives and contacts were inter-
viewed to assess possible inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) subtype expo-
sures. Particular attention was paid to potential exposures 
such as contact with well-appearing, sick, or dead poultry; 
visits to poultry markets; or contact with persons with fe-
brile respiratory symptoms in the 2 weeks before onset. A 
rural case was 1 that occurred in a village resident; an urban 
case was 1 that occurred in a city resident.
From October 2005 through October 2006, 20 con-
ﬁ  rmed cases were reported from 12 provinces. Six cases 
were identiﬁ  ed in 6 cities of 5 provinces; each city had an 
average population of 8.3 million and was at least 112 km 
away from cities with another case (Figure 1). More urban 
cases were reported in 2006 (5 [42%] of 12) than in 2005 (1 
[13%] of 8), but this difference was not statistically signiﬁ  -
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cant (p = 0.325) (Figure 2). Demographic and clinical char-
acteristics of the 6 urban patients with inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
cases are presented in Table 1. All 6 urban patients were 
adults, median age 30 years (range 21 to 41); 5 died.
Five of the 6 urban case-patients had no direct con-
tact with poultry. One patient prepared freshly slaughtered 
chicken that she purchased for cooking at a live (wet) 
poultry market. No patients kept poultry or other animals 
at home, and no poultry or poultry outbreaks were identi-
ﬁ  ed in their neighborhoods. Five patients had visited wet 
poultry markets within a week of illness onset, and all had 
visited a wet market during the 2 weeks before their ill-
ness. Three patients visited wet markets at least once a day 
before illness onset. Only 1 patient (case-patient 5) had any 
travel history in the 2 weeks before illness onset. That pa-
tient had visited his parents’ home in a rural area, where 
healthy backyard poultry were kept outside the house, and 
he had visited a wet market in the same area 2 weeks before 
illness onset (Table 2).
All 6 patients had no known contact with other con-
ﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) patients or with anyone with 
febrile respiratory symptoms. A total of 640 persons were 
followed up for medical observation for 2 weeks, including 
136 close contacts of the 6 patients, 389 healthcare workers 
who provided care for them, and 115 persons who worked 
in the poultry markets visited by the patients. Febrile re-
spiratory illness developed in 5 contacts: case-patient 1’s 
mother, case-patient 3’s girlfriend, case-patient 6’s daugh-
ter, a nurse who cared for case-patient 6, and a patient 
hospitalized on the same ward as case-patient 6. All 5 ill 
contacts recovered, and all respiratory specimens collected 
from them tested negative for inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) by re-
verse-transcriptase–PCR. Paired acute- and convalescent-
phase serum samples collected from these 5 ill contacts 
tested negative for subtype (H5N1) neutralizing antibodies 
by microneutralization assay.
Conclusions
Our study suggests that exposure to wet poultry mar-
kets may be an important inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) risk factor 
for persons in urban areas of China. None of the 6 case-pa-
tients had known direct contact with poultry that were sick 
or died of illness. Two patients (case-patients 1 and 3) had 
no identiﬁ  ed potential exposures except for visiting a wet 
poultry market during the week before illness onset. Four 
other case-patients visited wet markets, although other ex-
posures could have potentially led to virus transmission. 
Case-patient 2 was an egg seller and could have also been 
infected by contact with fecally contaminated eggs. In 2005, 
inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) virus was isolated from eggs brought 
to China by travelers from Vietnam (11). Case-patient 4 
could potentially have been exposed to the virus through 
preparation of freshly slaughtered chickens purchased at 
a wet market. Case-patient 5 could have been exposed to 
the virus by visiting his parents’ home, which had healthy 
backyard poultry outside, or by transporting eggs. Case-pa-
tient 6 could have been exposed to the virus at home when 
his wife prepared a freshly slaughtered chicken purchased 
from a wet market. No epidemiologic evidence suggested 
human-to-human transmission of inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) as-
sociated with the urban patients.
These observations are consistent with results of a 
case-control study conducted during the 1997 inﬂ  uenza A 
(H5N1) outbreak in Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, which found the most statistically signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  u-
enza (H5N1) risk factor was visiting a live poultry market 
the week before illness onset (12). During that outbreak, 
widespread subtype (H5N1) poultry dieoffs occurred in 
wet markets, but these dieoffs have not been observed in 
urban China. The role of poultry vaccination in decreas-
ing poultry outbreaks in wet markets in China is unknown. 
A recent simulation study showed that silent spread of the 
virus can occur in poultry because of incomplete protection 
Figure 1. Map showing distribution of 6 human inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
cases from urban areas of People’s Republic of China, compared 
with 14 cases from rural areas. The 6 urban cases were distributed 
sporadically in 6 large cities of 5 provinces, and none was 
associated with conﬁ  rmed H5N1 subtype poultry outbreaks or sick 
and dead poultry.
Figure 2. Number of human inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) cases in urban and 
rural areas, by month of onset, People’s Republic of China, October 
2005–September 2006.Human Inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) Cases, China
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at the ﬂ  ock level, even if a poultry vaccine is effective in 
individual birds (13).
In China, wet markets are sustained by demand for 
freshly slaughtered poultry. Wet markets are considered 
a reservoir and ampliﬁ  er of avian inﬂ  uenza A viruses be-
cause they bring together avian host species in a high-den-
sity setting that can facilitate viral persistence, cross-spe-
cies infection, and genetic reassortment (14). Our ﬁ  ndings 
suggest that wet markets pose a risk that is likely to be low 
for avian-to-human transmission of subtype (H5N1) in ur-
Table 1. Characteristics of 6 human influenza A (H5N1) case-patients from urban areas of China 
Case-patient no. 
Characteristic 123 456
Location
(city, province) 
Sanming,
Fujian
Chengdu,
Sichuan
Guangzhou, 
Guangdong 
Shanghai,
Shanghai
Wuhan, Hubei  Shenzhen,
Guangdong 
Residence Apartment Apartment Apartment Temporary, at
construction site 
Dormitory Apartment
Illness onset date  Dec 6, 2005  Jan 10, 2006  Feb 22, 2006  Mar 13, 2006  Apr 1, 2006  Jun 3, 2006 
Days from onset to 
investigation
6 7 6 8 10 8
Contact with ill 
persons before onset 
No No No No No No
Days from onset to 
first medical visit 
243 254
Days from onset to 
hospital admission 
3 7 5 9 11 7
Primary signs and 
symptoms at 
admission
Fever, 
headache,
cough
Fever, cough, 
diarrhea,
myalgia 
Fever, chills, 
cough, shortness 
of breath 
Fever, chills, 
cough
Fever, 
headache, sore 
throat, cough, 
myalgia 
Fever, chills, 
productive
cough, back pain
Complications* Respiratory 
failure, ARDS, 
cardiac failure, 
septicemia
Respiratory 
failure, ARDS, 
cardiac failure, 
septicemia
Respiratory 
failure, ARDS 
Respiratory 
failure, ARDS, 
cardiac failure 
Respiratory 
failure, ARDS, 
cardiac failure, 
septicemia
Respiratory 
failure, ARDS 
Outcome Died Died Died Died Died Survived
Days from onset to 
death
16 14 9 9 19 Discharged
61 d from onset 
*Respiratory failure was defined as the need for ventilator support; ARDS, acute respiratory distress syndrome, is a life-threatening condition in which 
inflammation of the lungs and accumulation of fluid in the air sacs (alveoli) lead to low blood oxygen levels; cardiac failure was defined as the requirement 
of isotropic agents. 
Table 2. Exposure history of 6 influenza A (H5N1) case-patients from urban areas of China 
Case-patient no.  Epidemiologic information 
1 41-y-old female factory worker, previously healthy, with a history of thymectomy for benign thymoma 6 wk before 
illness onset, had recovered fully, did not require any medications, and resumed working. She visited a wet market 
nearly every day the week before illness onset but did not purchase poultry or poultry products. No poultry were 
kept in her home or neighborhood.
2 29-y-old woman, previously healthy, worked at a stall that she owned at a wet market, selling groceries and eggs. 
Her stall was ≈20 m away from stalls selling and slaughtering live poultry. No poultry were kept in her home or 
neighborhood. 
3 32-y-old man, previously healthy, quit his job 1 mo before illness onset and was planning to start his own food 
business. He visited up to 9 wet markets for 10–40 min every day during the week before illness onset. At 1 wet 
market, he spent most of his time in a sauce store that was ≈5 m away from stalls where poultry were slaughtered 
and sold. No poultry were kept in his home or neighborhood. 
4 29-y-old woman, previously healthy, moved from Guangdong to Shanghai 2 mo before illness onset. She worked as 
a cook for 14 people at a construction site, where she lived temporarily, and visited a wet market every day to buy 
fresh food, including freshly slaughtered chickens, 1 wk before illness onset. No poultry were kept in her home or 
neighborhood. 
5 21-y-old man, previously healthy, was a security guard for an aircraft-repairing factory in Wuhan. Two wk before 
illness onset, he traveled to his hometown in the rural area of Enshi to attend the funeral of his uncle, who died of 
esophageal cancer. The man stayed there for 6 d, visited his parents’ home, where healthy backyard poultry were 
kept (none became sick or died), and visited a wet market. One wk before onset, he traveled back to his workplace 
in Wuhan, bringing 200 eggs from his hometown. In Wuhan, he had no direct contact with poultry, and he did not 
visit any wet markets. No poultry were kept in his home or neighborhood. 
6 31-y-old man, previously healthy, worked as a truck driver for shoe factories in Shenzhen city. Two d before illness 
onset, he visited a wet market once, but he did not purchase any poultry or poultry products. One wk before onset, 
his wife visited the same market and brought a live chicken that was slaughtered at the market. No abnormal dieoffs 
of poultry were reported. No poultry were kept in his home or neighborhood. DISPATCHES
1064  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 13, No. 7, July 2007
ban settings. Viral RNA for subtype (H5N1) was detected 
in a specimen collected from a goose cage at an urban wet 
market visited by case-patient 3 (15), which suggests the 
potential for inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) transmission through envi-
ronmental contamination.
We were limited by inability to elicit complete expo-
sure histories from all case-patients because of their severe 
illness or death. However, we interviewed household and 
family members, friends, and co-workers, and investigated 
places that patients had visited in the 2 weeks before illness 
onset. We were unable to ascertain how human infection 
with the virus occurred through the patients’ visits to wet 
poultry markets. Possibilities include self-inoculation of 
the respiratory tract after touching subtype (H5N1)–con-
taminated surfaces, or inhalation of aerosolized debris with 
inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) virus.
We did not perform testing on poultry or environ-
mental specimens and can only speculate about potential 
exposures and sources of inﬂ  uenza A subtype (H5N1) in-
fection in wet markets, homes, and neighborhoods. Future 
studies should test tracheal, cloacal, and blood specimens 
from poultry; swabs of fecal material, cages, and other po-
tentially contaminated surfaces; and air specimens in wet 
markets, for evidence of inﬂ  uenza (H5N1). More research 
studies, including case-control studies, are needed to better 
clarify the risk for subtype (H5N1) transmission that occurs 
from visiting wet poultry markets. Close collaborations are 
needed between animal health and public health agencies 
to reduce the public health risk for this virus in wet poultry 
markets and to understand the impact of poultry vaccina-
tion on the risk for transmission.
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